The political economy of high speed rail in Florida: a case study
In the 1980’s and 1990’s, two French-American consortia attempted to develop very high speed rail (150+ mph) between Miami, Orlando, and Tampa, Florida. Their first attempt failed because public officials, who were committed to neo-liberal policies, opposed use of traditional, publicly subsidized, p...
保存先:
| 出版年: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/rhcf, |
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| 第一著者: | |
| フォーマット: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| 言語: | Anglais |
| 出版事項: |
Revue d’histoire des chemins de fer
2022
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| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| 要約: | In the 1980’s and 1990’s, two French-American consortia attempted to develop very high speed rail (150+ mph) between Miami, Orlando, and Tampa, Florida. Their first attempt failed because public officials, who were committed to neo-liberal policies, opposed use of traditional, publicly subsidized, project finance mechanisms. Thus, sponsors turned to generating private capital from real estate development and tax exempt debt. A recession in property valuations, and refusal of Federal authorities to grant tax exemptions, undermined this plan. The 1990’s consortium shifted to a public-private partnership approach, which almost succeeded. However, Jeb Bush, a neo-liberal, elected Governor in 1999, killed the project by refusing to allocate public funding. Finally, in 2017, an American corporation launched moderate speed (79‑125 mph) train service, which is financed with property development methods similar to the 1980’s. This raises important questions about whether the earlier high cost, very high speed projects would have been more likely to succeed if based on less expensive moderate speed infrastructure. |
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