Legal methodology and obligation
In this contribution, I intend to introduce the bare bones of a theoretical account of the distinctive kind of obligation engendered by legal institutions and practices. The proposed account is driven by a specific methodology — to which I will refer below as “presuppositional interpretation” — that...
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| Publicado en: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Autor Principal: | |
| Formato: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Anglais |
| Publicado: |
Revus
2026
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| Sujets: | |
| Acceso en liña: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Résumé: | In this contribution, I intend to introduce the bare bones of a theoretical account of the distinctive kind of obligation engendered by legal institutions and practices. The proposed account is driven by a specific methodology — to which I will refer below as “presuppositional interpretation” — that I consider most adequate to the theoretical study of law. The main assumption underpinning the argument deployed in what follows is that there is an inextricable link — a relationship of conceptual co-dependence — between the methodology used to approach legal issues and the explanation of legal obligation. |
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