A disenchantment of legal concepts
The argument presented in the paper revolves around the question of the existence of legal concepts. It is widely assumed that concepts are essential in reasoning in general, and legal reasoning in particular. Meanwhile, it is surprisingly difficult to grasp and explain the nature and structure of c...
محفوظ في:
| الحاوية / القاعدة: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
| التنسيق: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| اللغة: | Anglais |
| منشور في: |
Revus
2025
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |