Norms as functions and the method of legal logic
This comment replies to Pascal Felix Meier’s claim that norms can be reconstructed as functions. It argues that, although norms and functions both connect conditions with consequences, the analogy is limited. Norms do not merely associate inputs with values; they create duties. Whereas mathematical...
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| Publicat a: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Anglais |
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Revus
2026
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| Accés en línia: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Sumari: | This comment replies to Pascal Felix Meier’s claim that norms can be reconstructed as functions. It argues that, although norms and functions both connect conditions with consequences, the analogy is limited. Norms do not merely associate inputs with values; they create duties. Whereas mathematical functions only express timeless relations between arguments and values. The comment further argues that treating ought-facts as functions from actions to evaluations of correctness only captures the evaluative role of norms and neglects their behaviour-guiding function. Since norms concern action types rather than act tokens, the attempt to model them through possible acts raises difficult metaphysical problems. On this basis, the usefulness of formalization as a starting point for legal logic is questioned. I suggest that an adequate informal theory of legal reasoning and legal norms should precede any decision about whether formal techniques are useful. |
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