Conceptual analysis and the prototype theory of concept formation
This article critiques Miodrag Jovanović's defense of the prototype theory of concepts as an alternative to metaphysically driven conceptual analysis. It argues that Jovanović's approach confuses the psychological process of concept formation with the semantic theory of conceptual content,...
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| Publicat a: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Anglais |
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Revus
2025
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| Accés en línia: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Sumari: | This article critiques Miodrag Jovanović's defense of the prototype theory of concepts as an alternative to metaphysically driven conceptual analysis. It argues that Jovanović's approach confuses the psychological process of concept formation with the semantic theory of conceptual content, failing to provide a new methodology distinct from metaphysical theorizing. The article highlights the distinction between the prototype theory of concept formation (PCF) and the prototype theory of conceptual content (PCC), emphasizing that the latter cannot be deduced from the former. While PCC suggests that concepts have graded membership based on similarity to prototypes, this does not necessarily follow from PCF's empirical observations. The article concludes that prototype methodologies might complement rather than replace traditional conceptual analysis, particularly for concepts with resemblance-based membership criteria. |
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