Self-absorbed, yet interesting?
Two kinds of criticism are often raised against contemporary general jurisprudence – the part of legal philosophy dealing with the most abstract questions about law. The more fundamental criticism claims that questions discussed by general jurisprudence might actually not be interesting for other sc...
Zapisane w:
| Wydane w: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| 1. autor: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Język: | Anglais |
| Wydane: |
Revus
2025
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| Hasła przedmiotowe: | |
| Dostęp online: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Streszczenie: | Two kinds of criticism are often raised against contemporary general jurisprudence – the part of legal philosophy dealing with the most abstract questions about law. The more fundamental criticism claims that questions discussed by general jurisprudence might actually not be interesting for other scholars. The other one suspects that, as currently practiced, it suffers from self-referentiality and lack of interest in other related discourses. In this article, I attempt to test the empirical assumptions present in both claims, using bibliometric tools. First, employing co-citation analysis, I identify the set of 169 central texts in general jurisprudence within the broader network of 713 core texts in (mostly Anglophone) legal philosophy. This provides ground for the analysis of citation flows, resulting in the following conclusions: General jurisprudence, when compared to other areas of legal philosophy, is distinctively self-referential, yet it still appears to spark some interest among other scholars, in legal philosophy and elsewhere. |
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