Effets de la taille et de l’indépendance du Conseil d’Administration sur la performance des sociétés endettées
This article studies the relationship between Board structure and the performance of indebted companies. Debt, as a means of managerial control and a factor of complexity, is considered a major issue in financial governance. This article examines the effect of Board size and independence on the perf...
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| Autors principals: | , |
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| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Français |
| Publicat: |
2025
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| Accés en línia: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Sumari: | This article studies the relationship between Board structure and the performance of indebted companies. Debt, as a means of managerial control and a factor of complexity, is considered a major issue in financial governance. This article examines the effect of Board size and independence on the performance of indebted companies. The statistical study is based on companies belonging to the CAC All-Tradable index between 2015 and 2019. Above all, results show that it is not in the financial interest of indebted companies to opt for large and predominantly independent Boards of Directors. |
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