The Symbiotic Nature of Collective Bargaining: The Case of Wage Bargaining in Major League Baseball
In this paper we address the symbiotic relationship that exists in Major League Baseball (MLB) between sectoral and enterprise level collective bargaining. While there has been much discussion regarding the merits and problems with these two levels of bargaining, we demonstrate that in the...
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Sprache: | Français |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2026
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online Zugang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Zusammenfassung: | In this paper we address the symbiotic relationship that exists in Major League Baseball (MLB) between sectoral and enterprise level collective bargaining. While there has been much discussion regarding the merits and problems with these two levels of bargaining, we demonstrate that in the case of MLB both co-exist quite effectively. Instead of focusing on which level of negotiations is most appropriate, we argue that both sectoral and firm-level collective bargaining with individual players can operate together as a regulation mechanism in wage bargaining.
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