When incentives backfire: Transparency as a moderator of the effects of equity incentive programs on bank efficiency
This study examines the effect of equity incentive programs (EIPs) on bank operational efficiency, with a particular focus on the moderating role of transparency. Using panel data from European listed banks, we identify a causal relationship between EIPs and reduced cost efficiency. However, this...
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Lingua: | Français |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Riassunto: | This study examines the effect of equity incentive programs (EIPs) on bank operational efficiency, with a particular focus on the moderating role of transparency. Using panel data from European listed banks, we identify a causal relationship between EIPs and reduced cost efficiency. However, this adverse effect occurs only in banks with high opacity, regardless of ownership structure; in transparent banks, the effect disappears, indicating that disclosure and oversight can mitigate potential inefficiencies. These findings reconcile mixed evidence in prior literature by showing that transparency, rather than ownership structure, determines the impact of EIPs on bank operational efficiency.
JEL classification: G21, G32, G34
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