Note critiche sul c.d. premierato elettivo
The proposed revision of Italy’s system of government raises serious concerns: the direct election of the head of government risks concentrating excessive power in the executive, weakening institutional checks and reducing the role of Parliament. The author emphasizes that the drive toward governmen...
Enregistré dans:
| Udgivet i: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/tp, |
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| Hovedforfatter: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Sprog: | Italien |
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Teoria politica
2026
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| Online adgang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Summary: | The proposed revision of Italy’s system of government raises serious concerns: the direct election of the head of government risks concentrating excessive power in the executive, weakening institutional checks and reducing the role of Parliament. The author emphasizes that the drive toward governmental «stability» could result in a compression of representativeness and a weakening of the balance of powers, with the danger of a more vertical and less pluralist democracy. In this sense, the proposed reform appears not so much as a remedy to the fragilities of the Italian political system, but rather as a misguided solution that risks altering the very nature of our parliamentary democracy. |
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