Il ritorno della disobbedienza civile. Un concetto controverso per tutte le stagioni?
The past decades have witnessed a growing debate over the legitimacy and effectiveness of civil disobedience as a form of political action, especially in the context of the perceived crisis of representative democracy. This paper explores the conditions under which civil disobedience can be consider...
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| Gepubliceerd in: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/tp, |
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| Hoofdauteur: | |
| Formaat: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Taal: | Italien |
| Gepubliceerd in: |
Teoria politica
2026
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| Onderwerpen: | |
| Online toegang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Samenvatting: | The past decades have witnessed a growing debate over the legitimacy and effectiveness of civil disobedience as a form of political action, especially in the context of the perceived crisis of representative democracy. This paper explores the conditions under which civil disobedience can be considered legitimate, focusing on actions that violate the law for moral or political principles. It examines recent phenomena –such as throwing soup at a Van Gogh painting, toppling controversial statues, sabotaging polluting technologies, and rescuing migrants– to assess whether these acts qualify as civil disobedience or represent alternative forms of dissent. The distinction is crucial, as the label of «civil disobedience» carries moral and historical weight, evoking figures like Rosa Parks, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King Jr. The paper argues that not all law-breaking protests are civil disobedience; some may be better understood as direct actions.The analysis begins by revisiting John Rawls’ influential definition of civil disobedience. Rawls’ criteria –publicity, nonviolence, fidelity to the legal order, and acceptance of penalties– have been both defended and contested. Some critics argue that these criteria are overly restrictive. Others, like Candice Delmas, advocate for the legitimacy of uncivil disobedience, where provocative or partially concealed protests challenge public norms. Despite these debates, the paper clarifies that the “civility” of disobedience does not automatically justify it; substantive reasons for the protest remain central.The paper then contrasts civil disobedience with direct action, which seeks immediate material change rather than symbolic communication. Direct actions, such as blocking arms shipments, rescuing migrants, or sabotaging polluting infrastructure, often involve covert or coercive elements that distinguish them from civil disobedience. This distinction is framed as one between communicative disobedience and operative disobedience, with the latter evaluated based on proportionality rather than civility.Hybrid cases, such as the vandalism of controversial monuments, illustrate the blurred boundaries between these categories. The paper concludes by emphasizing the importance of conceptual clarity in public debate, arguing that the justification for civil disobedience and direct action depends on context, urgency, and the exhaustion of legal alternatives. In democratic regimes, both forms of disobedience must be nonviolent and employed as a last resort. However, their normative evaluation differs: communicative disobedience relies on its ability to engage the public discursively, while operative disobedience is assessed by its proportionality to the harm it seeks to prevent or redress. |
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