Le peuple est souverain. Oui, mais quel peuple?
This article explores the evolving concept of popular sovereignty in France, particularly following the 1962 constitutional reform introducing direct presidential elections. It contrasts this with Italy’s ongoing constitutional debate regarding executive leadership. The core argument is that while b...
Enregistré dans:
| Udgivet i: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/tp, |
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| Hovedforfatter: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Sprog: | Italien |
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Teoria politica
2026
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| Fag: | |
| Online adgang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Summary: | This article explores the evolving concept of popular sovereignty in France, particularly following the 1962 constitutional reform introducing direct presidential elections. It contrasts this with Italy’s ongoing constitutional debate regarding executive leadership. The core argument is that while both French and Italian constitutions uphold popular sovereignty, its practical understanding has shifted. French legal tradition distinguished between national sovereignty (abstract, represented by officials) and popular sovereignty (a real, empirical populace with direct power). The 1946 and 1958 French constitutions attempted a synthesis: «national sovereignty belongs to the people, who exercise it through their representatives and by way of referendum». Despite this, the «people» legally often remains an abstract entity defined by law. The direct election of the President, seemingly empowering the populace, has redefined this sovereign entity. Historically, the King in 1791 was a representative only legislatively, not executively. Even post-1962, the President was officially an «arbitrator», not a direct popular representative. However, direct election granted the President significant de facto power, influencing legislative elections and controlling parliamentary majorities. This blurs the abstract «people» with the electorate, specifically the presidential majority. The Constitutional Council’s 1962 ruling on the presidential election reform further solidified this. By deeming referendum-adopted laws the «direct expression of national sovereignty» and immune to judicial review, the Council equated the sovereign people with the electoral body, distinct from the broader «people» represented by Parliament. In conclusion, direct executive election, intended to boost democracy, has created two «French peoples»: an abstract entity represented by Parliament, and a more concrete, potentially minoritarian, segment of the electorate directly electing the President. This duality, it is argued, fuels populist rhetoric and complicates the understanding of who holds sovereign power. |
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