Il libero arbitrio. Antinomia, mistero o problema?
Historically, determinism has been considered the main obstacle to the existence of free will. The locus par excellence where the question has been posed is the celebrated third antinomy, presented by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant reflects on the seemingly deadlocked opposition between h...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/tp, |
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Sprache: | Italien |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Teoria politica
2025
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online Zugang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Zusammenfassung: | Historically, determinism has been considered the main obstacle to the existence of free will. The locus par excellence where the question has been posed is the celebrated third antinomy, presented by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant reflects on the seemingly deadlocked opposition between human freedom (defended in the thesis) and universal determination (presented in the antithesis). On the one hand, we cannot but admit that freedom exists, primarily insofar as it grounds the very possibility of responsibility. On the other hand, Newtonian physics – which Kant accepts – is deterministic: it follows that human beings, as entities that belong to the phenomenal world, cannot escape the deterministic order of nature. If determinism seems to compromise the possibility of free choices, in any case, indeterminism does not seem to be a good ally of free will either. According to a traditional view, much debated today, in the absence of sufficient causes at the origin of human actions, these would simply occur randomly. And if universal determination calls free will into question, it seems difficult to argue that actions that occur by chance can be defined free. The apparent insolubility of the problem of free will has led several contemporary philosophers to take sceptical positions. Some deny the possibility of finding answers to such a complex problem in light of our limited cognitive capacities. These kinds of positions, held by, among others, Colin McGinn, Noam Chomsky and Peter van Inwagen, are called «Mysterian» positions. In this article, the structure of the Kantian antinomy is briefly discussed (section 2), then the Mysterian approach is introduced (section 3). Afterwards, some arguments against Mysterianism are presented (sections 4, 5, 6). |
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