Beyond discrimination
According to my reading of Añón’s proposal, a critical shift in our legal perspective is required for improving the performance of legal judgments and decisions vis-à-vis women’s concerns. Such a shift would entail overcoming standards of discrimination based on a comparison between unencumbered ind...
محفوظ في:
| الحاوية / القاعدة: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
| التنسيق: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| اللغة: | Anglais |
| منشور في: |
Revus
2023
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| الملخص: | According to my reading of Añón’s proposal, a critical shift in our legal perspective is required for improving the performance of legal judgments and decisions vis-à-vis women’s concerns. Such a shift would entail overcoming standards of discrimination based on a comparison between unencumbered individuals, without their situated agency being considered—which results in comparing even when such comparison is impracticable—in order to embrace a contextual analysis of individual cases. The move from one pattern to the other implies assimilating the structural bases of discrimination, as well as the relevance of gender analysis for overcoming inequality. In the following I would like to keep arguing in the direction traced by Añón. I will focus on the two main aspects of her analysis: the comparator and stereotypes. In addition, I will consider intersectionality and the contribution of experts, and will analyse in detail the methodology of naming and the contextual interpretation of women’s rights. |
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