Conceptual analysis and the Coercion Thesis
In chapter two of Coercion and the Nature of Law, Kenneth Himma sets his defence of the Coercion Thesis – the thesis that it is a conceptual truth, and not merely a practical necessity, that a legal system contains sanctions – within an account of the nature of conceptual analysis. I discuss his acc...
محفوظ في:
| الحاوية / القاعدة: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
| التنسيق: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| اللغة: | Anglais |
| منشور في: |
Revus
2021
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| الملخص: | In chapter two of Coercion and the Nature of Law, Kenneth Himma sets his defence of the Coercion Thesis – the thesis that it is a conceptual truth, and not merely a practical necessity, that a legal system contains sanctions – within an account of the nature of conceptual analysis. I discuss his account, and the nature of conceptual analysis more widely, explaining why I follow Himma in accepting the Coercion Thesis. I conclude with a short discussion of where I think he misunderstands the distinction between modest conceptual and immodest conceptual analysis. |
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