Contra el modelo conversacional de la interpretación jurídica
The so-called conversational model claims that legal interpretation does not significantly differ from ordinary understanding: both are inferential processes complying with a pattern that can be traced back to Paul Grice’s thesis. This essay seeks to criticize such a claim, showing that the so-calle...
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| Gepubliceerd in: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Formaat: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Taal: | Espagnol |
| Gepubliceerd in: |
Revus
2020
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| Onderwerpen: | |
| Online toegang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Samenvatting: | The so-called conversational model claims that legal interpretation does not significantly differ from ordinary understanding: both are inferential processes complying with a pattern that can be traced back to Paul Grice’s thesis. This essay seeks to criticize such a claim, showing that the so-called legislative intent is not able to play the role that speaker’s intention plays in ordinary understanding and the Gricean thesis. |
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