On ‘legal continuity’ in the post-sovereign model of constitution-making: three problems
One key notion in the post-sovereign paradigm of constitution-making is the idea of ‘legal continuity’. In The Adventures of the Constituent Power: Beyond Revolutions?, Andrew Arato states that this paradigm emerges from an ‘empirical pattern’ marked by legal continuity throughout transitions from o...
محفوظ في:
| الحاوية / القاعدة: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
|---|---|
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
| التنسيق: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| اللغة: | Anglais |
| منشور في: |
Revus
2020
|
| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| الملخص: | One key notion in the post-sovereign paradigm of constitution-making is the idea of ‘legal continuity’. In The Adventures of the Constituent Power: Beyond Revolutions?, Andrew Arato states that this paradigm emerges from an ‘empirical pattern’ marked by legal continuity throughout transitions from old legal systems to new ones. This would imply that it is possible to conceive of a ‘constituent power’ under the law, i.e., without producing legal ruptures. In this work, I will show that there are three problems concerning the idea of ‘legal continuity’ in this context: 1) a contingent obstacle for legal continuity in a ‘strong’ sense; 2) some conceptual uncertainties regarding the scope of the constitutional amendment power; and, 3) a conceptual inconsistency in the results of this legal continuity, related to the effective emergence of a new legal order. |
|---|