Prescribir y definir
Based on the criticisms raised against Bulyginʼs works on the norms of competence, I shall be arguing for a theory composed of four theses. The first thesis distinguishes two concepts of legal competence, which both belong to a more general sense of competence (not strictly legal). The second thesis...
Tallennettuna:
| Julkaisussa: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Päätekijä: | |
| Aineistotyyppi: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Kieli: | Espagnol |
| Julkaistu: |
Revus
2019
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| Aiheet: | |
| Linkit: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Yhteenveto: | Based on the criticisms raised against Bulyginʼs works on the norms of competence, I shall be arguing for a theory composed of four theses. The first thesis distinguishes two concepts of legal competence, which both belong to a more general sense of competence (not strictly legal). The second thesis holds that the attribution of competence in general sense amounts to a speakerʼs existential normative presupposition, when she makes a normative statement. The third thesis posits the distinction between legal power-conferring rules and procedural rules of legal power. Finally, the fourth thesis maintains that legal power-conferring rules perform a definitional and a deontic function as constitutive rules of legal practice. |
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