Legal normativity as a moral property
This paper comments on Brian Bix’s article “Kelsen, Hart, and Legal Normativity”. It provides some remarks regarding the concept of normativity and subscribes to the idea that it should not be reduced to an empirical nor a moral property. The discussion is primarily focused on the current, post-Hart...
Enregistré dans:
| Dans: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Langue: | Anglais |
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Revus
2019
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| Accès en ligne: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Résumé: | This paper comments on Brian Bix’s article “Kelsen, Hart, and Legal Normativity”. It provides some remarks regarding the concept of normativity and subscribes to the idea that it should not be reduced to an empirical nor a moral property. The discussion is primarily focused on the current, post-Hartian thesis that reduces legal normativity to moral normativity. In this regard, on the one hand, it advances a criticism of Bix’s analysis, which at first glance rejects both forms of reductionism but, at the end of the day accepts a post-Hartian approach that treats normativity as a moral property. On the other hand, it highlights that this moralist concept of normativity is primarily based on the assumption that normative terms have a unified meaning in moral and legal contexts and that, according to that meaning, normativity is a moral property. The proposal is that within a positivist approach, it is necessary to discuss these assumptions in order to give an adequate account of legal normativity as an essential property of every legal system. |
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