Incompatibility and entailment in the logic of norms
In this paper I examine critically some theses on the incompatibility and the implication between norms that appear in a well-known article by Bulygin on the conceptions of the logic of norms elaborated, respectively, by Weinberger and Kelsen. I also analyze Bulygin’s thesis according to which the e...
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| Опубликовано в: : | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Главный автор: | |
| Формат: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Язык: | Anglais |
| Опубликовано: |
Revus
2019
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| Предметы: | |
| Online-ссылка: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Итог: | In this paper I examine critically some theses on the incompatibility and the implication between norms that appear in a well-known article by Bulygin on the conceptions of the logic of norms elaborated, respectively, by Weinberger and Kelsen. I also analyze Bulygin’s thesis according to which the expressive conception of norms, defended by Kelsen in the last part of his career, is perfectly capable of explaining the relationship of justification that mediates between general norms and particular norms (especially, between legislated norms and judicial decisions) and, being capable of this, cannot be accused of “irrationalism”, as Weinberger argues instead. This work is concluded by formulating a dilemma that Bulygin should face: either the notion of the satisfaction of norms is accepted and the “rationalism” of the expressive conception is saved, or this notion is rejected and with it also the possibility of “expressive” rationality in legal reasoning. | A prior version of this text was presented on 28 July 2015, at the Special Workshop “Bulygin’s Philosophy of Law”, XXVII IVR Congress, Washington, DC (USA). |
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