A problem for the unambitious view of legal normativity
In this contribution, I discuss the so-called “unambitious view of legal normativity”, as it is specifically theorised by Brian Bix. While I agree with Bix that legal normativity should not be assumed to be reducible by default to moral normativity, I will argue that the normativity of law cannot be...
Tallennettuna:
| Julkaisussa: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Päätekijä: | |
| Aineistotyyppi: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Kieli: | Anglais |
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Revus
2019
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| Aiheet: | |
| Linkit: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Yhteenveto: | In this contribution, I discuss the so-called “unambitious view of legal normativity”, as it is specifically theorised by Brian Bix. While I agree with Bix that legal normativity should not be assumed to be reducible by default to moral normativity, I will argue that the normativity of law cannot be qualified as a sui generis form of normativity, for, pace Bix, the quality of legal normativity is best understood as genuine. That is, the normative claims the law makes on its subjects do address the general practical question: What ought we to do? |
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