Naturalism and the legal image of man
The first goal of this paper is to argue that the main reason why the naturalistic perspective on law does not gain traction in the literature is the prevailing legal image of man. According to this image, which has its roots in folk psychology, persons have the capacity to be authentically rational...
Wedi'i Gadw mewn:
| Cyhoeddwyd yn: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Prif Awdur: | |
| Fformat: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Iaith: | Anglais |
| Cyhoeddwyd: |
Revus
2017
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| Pynciau: | |
| Mynediad Ar-lein: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Crynodeb: | The first goal of this paper is to argue that the main reason why the naturalistic perspective on law does not gain traction in the literature is the prevailing legal image of man. According to this image, which has its roots in folk psychology, persons have the capacity to be authentically rational, i.e., they are able to recognize and to follow rules of rationality. The legal image of man is a powerful conceptual tool, used by legal theorists and practitioners to make sense of human behaviour in the legal context. However, I argue in this paper that this image seems to be in conflict with its scientific counterpart. The second goal of the chapter is to assess three stances toward the relation between the legal and the scientific images of man: revisionism, autonomy and integrationism. |
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