Legal disagreements
In this paper I analyse the problem of legal disagreements, initially raised by Ronald Dworkin against Hartian positivism. According to Dworkin, disagreements are pervasive, since law is an argumentative practice in which participants invoke normative arguments. Positivists, who claim that law depen...
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| Pubblicato in: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Autore principale: | |
| Natura: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Lingua: | Anglais |
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Revus
2016
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Riassunto: | In this paper I analyse the problem of legal disagreements, initially raised by Ronald Dworkin against Hartian positivism. According to Dworkin, disagreements are pervasive, since law is an argumentative practice in which participants invoke normative arguments. Positivists, who claim that law depends upon agreement among officials, have difficulties to make sense of the fact that lawyers frequently disagree. I first present the main arguments in the debate. I then go on to distinguish different levels at which lawyers disagree. Taking these levels into consideration, I articulate a pluralist reply that shows that the fundamental positivist tenets remain untouched by Dworkin’s challenge. |
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