In Defence of the Expressive Conception of Norms
Against a background of the past three decades of critique directed towards the expressive conception of norms, the author argues first that paradigm expressivists can well account for facultative states of affairs without introducing inconsistencies into the normative system. He then shows how to d...
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| הוצא לאור ב: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| מחבר ראשי: | |
| פורמט: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| שפה: | Anglais |
| יצא לאור: |
Revus
2014
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| נושאים: | |
| גישה מקוונת: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| סיכום: | Against a background of the past three decades of critique directed towards the expressive conception of norms, the author argues first that paradigm expressivists can well account for facultative states of affairs without introducing inconsistencies into the normative system. He then shows how to describe the propositional content of a meta-rule without semanticizing the force indicator of object-rules. Finally, the author provides a formal reconstruction of conditional norms and of permissive closure, without admitting the conceptual autonomy of acts of permitting. The first parts of this paper are of a clarifying nature, whereas the last parts purport to present an advancement in the expressivist theory. | A Spanish version of this text was published in Doxa. Cuadernos de filosofía del derecho 37 (2014). |
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