Thinking of Impossibility in Following Legal Norms
The starting point of this article is the recent publication Rule-Following. From Imitation to the Normative Mind by Bartosz Brożek. The main scope of this comment is to show the definite importance of linguistic categories in relation to legal language for comprehending, following, and even infring...
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| Publicado en: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Autor Principal: | |
| Formato: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Anglais |
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Revus
2014
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| Acceso en liña: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Résumé: | The starting point of this article is the recent publication Rule-Following. From Imitation to the Normative Mind by Bartosz Brożek. The main scope of this comment is to show the definite importance of linguistic categories in relation to legal language for comprehending, following, and even infringing legal rules. The purpose is to introduce the ancient legal maxim impossibilium nulla obligatio est giving a preliminary rough sketch of the problem of impossibility in following laws. In this respect, some passages of Brożek’s book regarding rules as patterns of conduct will be examined which are very useful to elucidate the role of linguistic categories in comprehending legal rules and the aforesaid problem of impossibility in law. In particular two general distinctions discussed in the book will be considered: the distinction between categorical and hypothetical rules on the one hand, and the distinction between the general criteria of rightness and correctness, on the other. |
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