The concept of obligation
It is a conceptual truth that obligations bind subjects. This essay explicates the nature of obligation in terms of its existence conditions to ascertain how obligations bind, by nature. It argues that P has an obligation to do a under N if and only if (1) N is a system of norms; (2) there is a mand...
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| Wydane w: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| 1. autor: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Język: | Anglais |
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Revus
2026
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| Hasła przedmiotowe: | |
| Dostęp online: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Streszczenie: | It is a conceptual truth that obligations bind subjects. This essay explicates the nature of obligation in terms of its existence conditions to ascertain how obligations bind, by nature. It argues that P has an obligation to do a under N if and only if (1) N is a system of norms; (2) there is a mandatory prescription n in N governing P’s behavior; (3) n requires P do a; (4) N excludes certain considerations as excusing or justifying noncompliance with n; (5) n binds P in virtue of implicating a liability that subjects regard as detriment to be avoided other things being equal because they should regard it as such; (6) n creates an objective reason that justifies P in doing a under N and immunizes P in N against the applicable liability; and (7) n creates an objective reason that is grounded in the undesirability of the liability to which N gives rise that functions to incline or motivate compliance. It concludes that obligations bind, by nature, by creating a liability to detriment that gives rise to a reason to comply as a means of avoiding its imposition and that obligations are thus conceptually normative. |
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