Ross, quus, and beyond
In this paper, I explore the possible connections between Ross’s paradox and the rule-following paradox discovered by Wittgenstein and later developed by Kripke, while also arguing that the latter was anticipated by insights from Peano, Russell, and Waismann. Ross’s paradox arises from the applicati...
محفوظ في:
| الحاوية / القاعدة: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
| التنسيق: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| اللغة: | Anglais |
| منشور في: |
Revus
2026
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| الملخص: | In this paper, I explore the possible connections between Ross’s paradox and the rule-following paradox discovered by Wittgenstein and later developed by Kripke, while also arguing that the latter was anticipated by insights from Peano, Russell, and Waismann. Ross’s paradox arises from the application of classical propositional logic to norms, whereas the Wittgenstein-Kripke paradox is usually explained by reference to mathematical examples and raises some problems in the philosophy of mathematics. First, I will introduce and discuss Ross’s paradox. I will then do the same for the rule-following paradox famously articulated by Kripke and see what follows from it in relation to Peano arithmetic. I will then discuss some insights from the philosophy of mathematics of Russell, Waismann, and Peano that are important for clarifying central issues related to the rule-following paradox and its foundations. In the final section, I analyse the possible connections between the two paradoxes. |
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