On the link between consistency and conflict in normative systems
This paper examines the relation between an inconsistent normative system and normative conflicts so as to determine whether the former is a necessary and/or a sufficient condition for the latter or, stated otherwise, whether a perfectly consistent normative system could guarantee the absence of nor...
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
| প্রকাশিত: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| প্রধান লেখক: | |
| বিন্যাস: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| ভাষা: | Anglais |
| প্রকাশিত: |
Revus
2025
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| বিষয়গুলি: | |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| সংক্ষিপ্ত: | This paper examines the relation between an inconsistent normative system and normative conflicts so as to determine whether the former is a necessary and/or a sufficient condition for the latter or, stated otherwise, whether a perfectly consistent normative system could guarantee the absence of normative conflicts and dilemmas. The traditional thesis that moral conflicts arise from inconsistencies or formal flaws within a normative system has been already challenged by some philosophers. Specifically, for Ruth B. Marcus, conflicts and dilemmas may arise even within the frame of a logically consistent system. Here, I analyse the connections between consistency and the phenomenon of normative conflicts, paying special attention to Marcus’s main arguments for the conclusion that normative conflicts may arise not only as a necessary consequence of an inconsistent system but also within the frame of a consistent one. In so doing, however, I show that it does not happen for the exact reasons she offers. |
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