Prototype theory of concepts and analytical account of law
This paper addresses three sets of issues. Considering the universal importance of categorization in the human world, it first highlights differences between the processes of concept-formation of items belonging to the natural and human-made world. Second, proceeding from experiments in cognitive ps...
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| Cyhoeddwyd yn: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Fformat: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Iaith: | Anglais |
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Revus
2025
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| Mynediad Ar-lein: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
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openedition-oai:revues.org:revus_10821 |
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openedition-oai:revues.org:revus_10821 https://doi.org/10.4000/13ew1 urn:doi:10.4000/13ew1 en https://journals.openedition.org/revus/10821 2025-03-03T01:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/13ew1 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ Prototype theory of concepts and analytical account of law Revus Klub Revus info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1855-7112 info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1581-7652 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus Jovanović, Miodrag methodology prototype theory concepts categorization analytical account of law metodologija pojmi kategorizacija prototipska teorija analitična teorija prava This paper addresses three sets of issues. Considering the universal importance of categorization in the human world, it first highlights differences between the processes of concept-formation of items belonging to the natural and human-made world. Second, proceeding from experiments in cognitive psychology, which have persistently demonstrated the relevance of typicality judgments, it tries to elucidate their scope and significance for an underlying theory of concepts. In the final step, the paper shows in what sense the ensuing prototype theory of concepts is germane for an attempt to conceptualize law in the tradition of analytic philosophy. Namely, if nothing else, cognitive science experiments demonstrated that the metaphysical inclination of analytical jurisprudence is grounded in scientifically unfounded psychological assumptions about the nature of our cognitive system and categorization. Prototipska teorija pojmov in analitična teorija prava. Članek obravnava tri sklope vprašanj. Ob upoštevanju univerzalnega pomena kategorizacije v človeškem svetu najprej izpostavi razlike med procesi oblikovanja pojmov za predmete, ki pripadajo naravnemu in človeku ustvarjenemu svetu. Drugič, izhajajoč iz eksperimentov v kognitivni psihologiji, ki so dosledno dokazali pomembnost sodb o tipičnosti, poskuša razložiti njihov obseg in pomen za temeljno teorijo pojmov. V zadnjem koraku članek pokaže, v kakšnem smislu je prototipska teorija pojmov pomembna za poskus konceptualizacije prava v tradiciji analitične filozofije. Namreč, če nič drugega, so eksperimenti kognitivne znanosti pokazali, da je metafizična nagnjenost analitične jurisprudence utemeljena na znanstveno neutemeljenih psiholoških predpostavkah o naravi našega kognitivnega sistema in kategorizacije. |
| collection |
OpenEdition Journal |
| language |
Anglais |
| format |
Article ou chapitre numérique |
| building |
0/Bibliothèque numérique/ 1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/ |
| topic |
methodology prototype theory concepts categorization analytical account of law metodologija pojmi kategorizacija prototipska teorija analitična teorija prava |
| spellingShingle |
methodology prototype theory concepts categorization analytical account of law metodologija pojmi kategorizacija prototipska teorija analitična teorija prava Jovanović, Miodrag Prototype theory of concepts and analytical account of law |
| description |
This paper addresses three sets of issues. Considering the universal importance of categorization in the human world, it first highlights differences between the processes of concept-formation of items belonging to the natural and human-made world. Second, proceeding from experiments in cognitive psychology, which have persistently demonstrated the relevance of typicality judgments, it tries to elucidate their scope and significance for an underlying theory of concepts. In the final step, the paper shows in what sense the ensuing prototype theory of concepts is germane for an attempt to conceptualize law in the tradition of analytic philosophy. Namely, if nothing else, cognitive science experiments demonstrated that the metaphysical inclination of analytical jurisprudence is grounded in scientifically unfounded psychological assumptions about the nature of our cognitive system and categorization. |
| author |
Jovanović, Miodrag |
| author_facet |
Jovanović, Miodrag |
| author_sort |
Jovanović, Miodrag |
| title |
Prototype theory of concepts and analytical account of law |
| title_short |
Prototype theory of concepts and analytical account of law |
| title_full |
Prototype theory of concepts and analytical account of law |
| title_fullStr |
Prototype theory of concepts and analytical account of law |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Prototype theory of concepts and analytical account of law |
| title_sort |
prototype theory of concepts and analytical account of law |
| publisher |
Revus |
| publishDate |
2025 |
| container_title |
URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus |
| url |
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/13ew1 https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/revus/10821 |
| _version_ |
1877292111763603456 |