Prototype theory of concepts and analytical account of law
This paper addresses three sets of issues. Considering the universal importance of categorization in the human world, it first highlights differences between the processes of concept-formation of items belonging to the natural and human-made world. Second, proceeding from experiments in cognitive ps...
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| Publicat a: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Anglais |
| Publicat: |
Revus
2025
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| Accés en línia: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Sumari: | This paper addresses three sets of issues. Considering the universal importance of categorization in the human world, it first highlights differences between the processes of concept-formation of items belonging to the natural and human-made world. Second, proceeding from experiments in cognitive psychology, which have persistently demonstrated the relevance of typicality judgments, it tries to elucidate their scope and significance for an underlying theory of concepts. In the final step, the paper shows in what sense the ensuing prototype theory of concepts is germane for an attempt to conceptualize law in the tradition of analytic philosophy. Namely, if nothing else, cognitive science experiments demonstrated that the metaphysical inclination of analytical jurisprudence is grounded in scientifically unfounded psychological assumptions about the nature of our cognitive system and categorization. |
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