Legal positions reexamined
This commentary originated from discussions held within the blind peer review process of David Duarte's paper ‘Rights as formal combinations of normative variables’, recently published in Revus (2023) 51. The author challenges Duarte's norm-based analysis of fundamental legal positions on...
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| Опубликовано в: : | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Главный автор: | |
| Формат: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Язык: | Anglais |
| Опубликовано: |
Revus
2025
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| Предметы: | |
| Online-ссылка: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Итог: | This commentary originated from discussions held within the blind peer review process of David Duarte's paper ‘Rights as formal combinations of normative variables’, recently published in Revus (2023) 51. The author challenges Duarte's norm-based analysis of fundamental legal positions on eight counts. It argues that Duarte's analysis fails to fully respect the distinction between genuine norms and normative propositions; raises insubstantial questions about norm individuation; does not clarify whether conditional norms rely on material conditionals, stronger generalized conditionals, or defeasible conditionals; misplaces the opportunity conditions for norm application in the antecedent of a conditional norm; wrongly assumes the universality of bilateral permissions for claim-right holders to accept the results of obligatory actions and that all exercises of legal power are necessarily permitted; and, finally, improperly reduces legal provisions of strong incompetence and immunity to merely declarative statements. |
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