Legal constitutionalism and the Ius/Lex distinction
This paper takes a critical look at Paolo Sandro's distinction between ius and lex, which, according to him, is essential to modern constitutionalism. After explaining why he thinks this distinction is important, I will explain why I think it is problematic in its own right, and furthermore, wh...
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| Udgivet i: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/revus, |
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| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
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Revus
2024
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| Online adgang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Summary: | This paper takes a critical look at Paolo Sandro's distinction between ius and lex, which, according to him, is essential to modern constitutionalism. After explaining why he thinks this distinction is important, I will explain why I think it is problematic in its own right, and furthermore, why it undermines several parts of Paolo’s main tenets. I will show that his main worry, namely, the question of “how are we to explain the existence of illegal/unlawful law?”, can be addressed and answered without having recourse to the ius/lex distinction. The somewhat banal adage "lex superior derogat inferiori" is much better suited to that task. |
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