Risk transfer, self-selection and ex post efficiency in public procurement
We use standard results from agency theory to assess the ex ante and ex post efficiency of the fixed price risk transfer contracts used to procure public infrastructure under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the United Kingdom. We argue that these contracts act as a revelation mechanism desig...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/rei, |
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| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Sprache: | Anglais |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Revue d’économie industrielle
2013
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| Online Zugang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |