Le labyrinthe de l’idéalisme: Scepticisme, réalisme et idéalisme dans l’élaboration de la « Doctrine de la science » de 1794
Why was Kantian idealism so inadequate in Fichte’s eyes that he needed to re-found the whole of philosophy in his Grundlage, based on a thorough re-examination of the intricacies of idealism leading to its ultimate re-definition? In order to answer this question, I will first examine the original qu...
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| Publicado en: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ref, |
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| Autor Principal: | |
| Formato: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Français |
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Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte
2026
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| Acceso en liña: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Résumé: | Why was Kantian idealism so inadequate in Fichte’s eyes that he needed to re-found the whole of philosophy in his Grundlage, based on a thorough re-examination of the intricacies of idealism leading to its ultimate re-definition? In order to answer this question, I will first examine the original question of the «Science of knowledge » (94/95). I will then analyze the meaning of how Fichte, in the Grundlage, typologizes various realisms and idealisms as being either qualitative, quantitative or abstract. This will allow me to show that Fichtean idealism is not determined by any kind of « philosophy of the subject » but rather by the question of the ideality of statement as raised by the problem of the nature of the enunciation of philosophic speech. As a conclusion, I will show how contemporary realism, which is characteristically critical of « idealism », is profoundly mistaken on two fundamental questions: firstly, because it establishes a link between idealism and subjectivity whereas it has been linked to ideality; secondly, because it defines idealism in the light of the categories of reality and of the existence of the thing whereas it is above all about the question of how one ascertains meaning. |
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