Fichte on Trial. The Atheist, the Nihilist, the Democrat
AbstractIn this article, I aim to elucidate the meaning of the accusations that J. G. Fichte faced in the context of the Atheism Dispute (Atheismusstreit), according to which his idealistic philosophy was deemed atheistic. In this framework, he was further accused of nihilism and, by his own reading...
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| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
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Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte
2026
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| Online Zugang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Zusammenfassung: | AbstractIn this article, I aim to elucidate the meaning of the accusations that J. G. Fichte faced in the context of the Atheism Dispute (Atheismusstreit), according to which his idealistic philosophy was deemed atheistic. In this framework, he was further accused of nihilism and, by his own reading of the charges, branded as a Jacobin-democrat. The goal is to identify in his works—Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (1794-1795) as well as the Revolutionsschriften (1793-1794) and the texts written during the Dispute (1798-1799)—the conceptual nodes on which these labels are based. In this regard, reference is also made to his philosophical relationship with F. H. Jacobi, who played a significant role in the Dispute: Jacobi both criticized Fichte and delineated a dichotomy between his own religious thinking and Fichte’s moral-idealism. The purpose of this analysis is twofold: to shed light on Fichte’s philosophical ideas, and to argue that the labels attributed to him and his philosophy have, in fact, a certain basis even if Fichte sometimes sought to dissociate himself from them. This examination highlights the metaphysical distinction between idealistic and dogmatic philosophy, as well as the differences in their practical implications, ultimately vindicating idealism as a philosophy of freedom and equality. |
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