A segunda fórmula da autoconsciência: o ‘como’ da consciência de si na Doutrina da Ciência nova methodo

In his groundbreaking article about Fichte’s original insight, Dieter Henrich identifies in the second version of the Science of Knowledge an important step in the unfolding of Fichte’s explanation of self-consciousness. Henrich holds that the formula, present in this version, “The I posits itself a...

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Egile nagusia: Klotz, Christian
Formatua: Article ou chapitre numérique
Hizkuntza:Portugais
Argitaratua: Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte 2026
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spelling openedition-oai:revues.org:ref_1872 https://doi.org/10.4000/ref.1872 urn:doi:10.4000/ref.1872 pt https://journals.openedition.org/ref/1872 2026-06-09T02:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/jqgg All rights reserved A segunda fórmula da autoconsciência: o ‘como’ da consciência de si na Doutrina da Ciência nova methodo Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte Universidade Federal do Espirito Santo info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2258-014X URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ref Klotz, Christian Reflection Self-consciousness Self-knowledge Intellectual intuition In his groundbreaking article about Fichte’s original insight, Dieter Henrich identifies in the second version of the Science of Knowledge an important step in the unfolding of Fichte’s explanation of self-consciousness. Henrich holds that the formula, present in this version, “The I posits itself as positing itself” expresses the idea that self-consciousness cannot be understood as arising from a mere act of reflection in the sense of the act through which a subject turns itself an object for itself, but must envolve also the understanding of this act as a self-referential act. With this, Henrich claims, self-consciousness is understood to be a unity of intuition and concept, the concept yielding the knowledge (Wissen) of oneself “as” oneself without which the self-representing act would not be self-consciousness in the proper sense. The article aims to show that in the second version of the Science of Knowedge the form of a consciousness of something ‘as’ something in fact plays an important role in Fichte’s explanation of self-consciousness. However, it is argued that the primordial ‘as’ of self-consciousness there is understood to be pre-reflective, not yet involving any conceptual recognition through which the I turns itself an object of discursive knowledge. Thus, Fichte’s conception of the ‘as’ of self-consciousness is more complex than that suggested by Henrich. It has its predecessor in Kant’s distinction between “mere” self-consciousness and self-knowledge, involving both the non-objectual, pre-reflective ‘as’ of self-consciousness, understood as intelectual intuition, and the objectual ‘as’ of self-knowledge.
collection OpenEdition Journal
language Portugais
format Article ou chapitre numérique
building 0/Bibliothèque numérique/
1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/
topic Reflection
Self-consciousness
Self-knowledge
Intellectual intuition
spellingShingle Reflection
Self-consciousness
Self-knowledge
Intellectual intuition
Klotz, Christian
A segunda fórmula da autoconsciência: o ‘como’ da consciência de si na Doutrina da Ciência nova methodo
description In his groundbreaking article about Fichte’s original insight, Dieter Henrich identifies in the second version of the Science of Knowledge an important step in the unfolding of Fichte’s explanation of self-consciousness. Henrich holds that the formula, present in this version, “The I posits itself as positing itself” expresses the idea that self-consciousness cannot be understood as arising from a mere act of reflection in the sense of the act through which a subject turns itself an object for itself, but must envolve also the understanding of this act as a self-referential act. With this, Henrich claims, self-consciousness is understood to be a unity of intuition and concept, the concept yielding the knowledge (Wissen) of oneself “as” oneself without which the self-representing act would not be self-consciousness in the proper sense. The article aims to show that in the second version of the Science of Knowedge the form of a consciousness of something ‘as’ something in fact plays an important role in Fichte’s explanation of self-consciousness. However, it is argued that the primordial ‘as’ of self-consciousness there is understood to be pre-reflective, not yet involving any conceptual recognition through which the I turns itself an object of discursive knowledge. Thus, Fichte’s conception of the ‘as’ of self-consciousness is more complex than that suggested by Henrich. It has its predecessor in Kant’s distinction between “mere” self-consciousness and self-knowledge, involving both the non-objectual, pre-reflective ‘as’ of self-consciousness, understood as intelectual intuition, and the objectual ‘as’ of self-knowledge.
author Klotz, Christian
author_facet Klotz, Christian
author_sort Klotz, Christian
title A segunda fórmula da autoconsciência: o ‘como’ da consciência de si na Doutrina da Ciência nova methodo
title_short A segunda fórmula da autoconsciência: o ‘como’ da consciência de si na Doutrina da Ciência nova methodo
title_full A segunda fórmula da autoconsciência: o ‘como’ da consciência de si na Doutrina da Ciência nova methodo
title_fullStr A segunda fórmula da autoconsciência: o ‘como’ da consciência de si na Doutrina da Ciência nova methodo
title_full_unstemmed A segunda fórmula da autoconsciência: o ‘como’ da consciência de si na Doutrina da Ciência nova methodo
title_sort segunda fórmula da autoconsciência: o ‘como’ da consciência de si na doutrina da ciência nova methodo
publisher Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte
publishDate 2026
container_title URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ref
url https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/ref.1872
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