A segunda fórmula da autoconsciência: o ‘como’ da consciência de si na Doutrina da Ciência nova methodo
In his groundbreaking article about Fichte’s original insight, Dieter Henrich identifies in the second version of the Science of Knowledge an important step in the unfolding of Fichte’s explanation of self-consciousness. Henrich holds that the formula, present in this version, “The I posits itself a...
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| Publicat a: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ref, |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Portugais |
| Publicat: |
Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte
2026
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| Accés en línia: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Sumari: | In his groundbreaking article about Fichte’s original insight, Dieter Henrich identifies in the second version of the Science of Knowledge an important step in the unfolding of Fichte’s explanation of self-consciousness. Henrich holds that the formula, present in this version, “The I posits itself as positing itself” expresses the idea that self-consciousness cannot be understood as arising from a mere act of reflection in the sense of the act through which a subject turns itself an object for itself, but must envolve also the understanding of this act as a self-referential act. With this, Henrich claims, self-consciousness is understood to be a unity of intuition and concept, the concept yielding the knowledge (Wissen) of oneself “as” oneself without which the self-representing act would not be self-consciousness in the proper sense. The article aims to show that in the second version of the Science of Knowedge the form of a consciousness of something ‘as’ something in fact plays an important role in Fichte’s explanation of self-consciousness. However, it is argued that the primordial ‘as’ of self-consciousness there is understood to be pre-reflective, not yet involving any conceptual recognition through which the I turns itself an object of discursive knowledge. Thus, Fichte’s conception of the ‘as’ of self-consciousness is more complex than that suggested by Henrich. It has its predecessor in Kant’s distinction between “mere” self-consciousness and self-knowledge, involving both the non-objectual, pre-reflective ‘as’ of self-consciousness, understood as intelectual intuition, and the objectual ‘as’ of self-knowledge. |
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