Fichte, Reinhold e o problema da apercepção originária kantiana

In agreement with Reinhold, Fichte supposes that the first principle of a system of reason must be formulated with respect to the derivation and justification of consequences from a certain first principle or supreme faculty. From the earliest established concepts of the WL (1794) to the later versi...

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1. Verfasser: Fracalossi, Ivanilde
Format: Article ou chapitre numérique
Sprache:Portugais
Veröffentlicht: Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte 2026
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spelling openedition-oai:revues.org:ref_1154 https://doi.org/10.4000/ref.1154 urn:doi:10.4000/ref.1154 pt https://journals.openedition.org/ref/1154 2026-06-09T02:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/jqfm All rights reserved Fichte, Reinhold e o problema da apercepção originária kantiana Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte Universidade Federal do Espirito Santo info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2258-014X URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ref Fracalossi, Ivanilde Fichte Kant Reinhold Schulze original apperception In agreement with Reinhold, Fichte supposes that the first principle of a system of reason must be formulated with respect to the derivation and justification of consequences from a certain first principle or supreme faculty. From the earliest established concepts of the WL (1794) to the later versions of new drafts of this doctrine in 1813 and 1814, we find renewed attempts by the author to unfold a first principle of philosophy in confrontation with Kant's original apperception. It is repeatedly stated that Kant obtained a very significant result from this concept, however it must be deepened because the original apperception was never "established as a principle" (Grudlage, FSW 1, 99), and was expressed only as "conditioning" consciousness and not as "determining" self-consciousness (WL, Zwei Einleitung, FSW 1, 477). When Fichte assumes with Reinhold the proposal of a first principle of philosophy valid for both theoretical and practical reasons, he understands the philosophical unification of the original apperception and he claims that Kant, by merely insinuating, gave insufficient grounds for it. It is in this problematic and in the way pointed by the two thinkers to the rectification of the Kantian theory that this article is directed.
collection OpenEdition Journal
language Portugais
format Article ou chapitre numérique
building 0/Bibliothèque numérique/
1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/
topic Fichte
Kant
Reinhold
Schulze
original apperception
spellingShingle Fichte
Kant
Reinhold
Schulze
original apperception
Fracalossi, Ivanilde
Fichte, Reinhold e o problema da apercepção originária kantiana
description In agreement with Reinhold, Fichte supposes that the first principle of a system of reason must be formulated with respect to the derivation and justification of consequences from a certain first principle or supreme faculty. From the earliest established concepts of the WL (1794) to the later versions of new drafts of this doctrine in 1813 and 1814, we find renewed attempts by the author to unfold a first principle of philosophy in confrontation with Kant's original apperception. It is repeatedly stated that Kant obtained a very significant result from this concept, however it must be deepened because the original apperception was never "established as a principle" (Grudlage, FSW 1, 99), and was expressed only as "conditioning" consciousness and not as "determining" self-consciousness (WL, Zwei Einleitung, FSW 1, 477). When Fichte assumes with Reinhold the proposal of a first principle of philosophy valid for both theoretical and practical reasons, he understands the philosophical unification of the original apperception and he claims that Kant, by merely insinuating, gave insufficient grounds for it. It is in this problematic and in the way pointed by the two thinkers to the rectification of the Kantian theory that this article is directed.
author Fracalossi, Ivanilde
author_facet Fracalossi, Ivanilde
author_sort Fracalossi, Ivanilde
title Fichte, Reinhold e o problema da apercepção originária kantiana
title_short Fichte, Reinhold e o problema da apercepção originária kantiana
title_full Fichte, Reinhold e o problema da apercepção originária kantiana
title_fullStr Fichte, Reinhold e o problema da apercepção originária kantiana
title_full_unstemmed Fichte, Reinhold e o problema da apercepção originária kantiana
title_sort fichte, reinhold e o problema da apercepção originária kantiana
publisher Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte
publishDate 2026
container_title URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ref
url https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/ref.1154
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