Fichte, Reinhold e o problema da apercepção originária kantiana
In agreement with Reinhold, Fichte supposes that the first principle of a system of reason must be formulated with respect to the derivation and justification of consequences from a certain first principle or supreme faculty. From the earliest established concepts of the WL (1794) to the later versi...
Enregistré dans:
| Udgivet i: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ref, |
|---|---|
| Hovedforfatter: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Sprog: | Portugais |
| Udgivet: |
Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte
2026
|
| Fag: | |
| Online adgang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Summary: | In agreement with Reinhold, Fichte supposes that the first principle of a system of reason must be formulated with respect to the derivation and justification of consequences from a certain first principle or supreme faculty. From the earliest established concepts of the WL (1794) to the later versions of new drafts of this doctrine in 1813 and 1814, we find renewed attempts by the author to unfold a first principle of philosophy in confrontation with Kant's original apperception. It is repeatedly stated that Kant obtained a very significant result from this concept, however it must be deepened because the original apperception was never "established as a principle" (Grudlage, FSW 1, 99), and was expressed only as "conditioning" consciousness and not as "determining" self-consciousness (WL, Zwei Einleitung, FSW 1, 477). When Fichte assumes with Reinhold the proposal of a first principle of philosophy valid for both theoretical and practical reasons, he understands the philosophical unification of the original apperception and he claims that Kant, by merely insinuating, gave insufficient grounds for it. It is in this problematic and in the way pointed by the two thinkers to the rectification of the Kantian theory that this article is directed. |
|---|