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In this article I argue that rational choice theory cannot play a crucial role in unifying theoretical and empirical work in sociology. Following Dennett, I claim that rationality, intentionality and, more generally, the mental facts are nothing more than an interpretation of certain events aimed to...
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| Publicat a: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/qds, |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Idioma: | Italien |
| Publicat: |
Quaderni di Sociologia
2016
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| Accés en línia: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Sumari: | In this article I argue that rational choice theory cannot play a crucial role in unifying theoretical and empirical work in sociology. Following Dennett, I claim that rationality, intentionality and, more generally, the mental facts are nothing more than an interpretation of certain events aimed to describe — or, at most, to predict — a given behaviour. It follows that theories of action based on intetio al mechanisms are Cartesian narratives evading physics laws, rather than scientific explanations. |
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