Can one be a fictionalist and a platonist at the same time? Lessons from Leibniz

Drawing on Leibniz’ thinking, this paper advocates two claims. Firstly, a continuous path can be drawn from the use of fictions inside mathematics, a widespread practice in the 16th and 17th centuries, to the use of mathematical entities as fictions outside mathematics (i.e. when it comes to employi...

詳細記述

保存先:
書誌詳細
出版年:URI:https://journals.openedition.org/noesis,
第一著者: Rabouin, David
フォーマット: Article ou chapitre numérique
言語:Anglais
出版事項: Noesis 2024
主題:
オンライン・アクセス:Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM
その他の書誌記述
要約:Drawing on Leibniz’ thinking, this paper advocates two claims. Firstly, a continuous path can be drawn from the use of fictions inside mathematics, a widespread practice in the 16th and 17th centuries, to the use of mathematical entities as fictions outside mathematics (i.e. when it comes to employing them for describing the natural world). In the first case, fictitious entities are contrasted to other mathematical entities posited as “real”; in the second, all mathematical entities can be said to be fictitious compared to “real” things, taken in the sense of “existing in the natural world”. Secondly, I will show why the path drawn in the first section allows one –and even requires one if we follow Leibniz– to be both a fictionalist and a Platonist at the same time.