Constitutional Customary Law and Constitutional Sanction: an Antinomy?
In constitutional scholarship, legal sanctions and customary law seem to be opposed to each other: customary law is often defined precisely as law without sanctions. Applied to the constitutional field, it is possible to better define those two elements of discourse: constitutional sanctions are ess...
保存先:
| 出版年: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/noesis, |
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| 第一著者: | |
| フォーマット: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| 言語: | Anglais |
| 出版事項: |
Noesis
2022
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| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| 要約: | In constitutional scholarship, legal sanctions and customary law seem to be opposed to each other: customary law is often defined precisely as law without sanctions. Applied to the constitutional field, it is possible to better define those two elements of discourse: constitutional sanctions are essentially procedures of constitutional review of legislation, while customary law is more frequently referred to as constitutional conventions. While insisting on the presence of the element of sanction is typical of the normative discourse attributed to Hans Kelsen, stressing the importance of constitutional conventions implies different strategic goals. Those goals are related to the definition of constitutional law and its specificity compared to other –less political– legal fields. |
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