Quel pouvoir mesure-t-on dans un jeu de vote ?
Several a priori power concepts for voting games are available in the literature. To name only a few, we have the Shapely-Shubik and the Banzhaf-Coleman's power indices, and the Taylor's influence relation. Each of these concepts is an attempt to rank the voters with respect to how much em...
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| Pubblicato in: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/msh, |
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| Autori principali: | , |
| Natura: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Lingua: | Français |
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Mathématiques et sciences humaines
2006
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| Accesso online: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
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openedition-oai:revues.org:msh_2821 |
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openedition |
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openedition-oai:revues.org:msh_2821 https://doi.org/10.4000/msh.2821 urn:doi:10.4000/msh.2821 fr https://journals.openedition.org/msh/2821 2006-02-10T01:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/igh8 All rights reserved Quel pouvoir mesure-t-on dans un jeu de vote ? Mathématiques et sciences humaines Centre d’analyse et de mathématique sociales de l’EHESS info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1950-6821 info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/0987-6936 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/msh Diffo Lambo, Lawrence Moulen, Joël jeu de vote jeu simple indice de pouvoir relation d'influence voting game simple game power indices influence relation Several a priori power concepts for voting games are available in the literature. To name only a few, we have the Shapely-Shubik and the Banzhaf-Coleman's power indices, and the Taylor's influence relation. Each of these concepts is an attempt to rank the voters with respect to how much empowered they are. In this paper, we are focused on the true nature of the power modelled by these concepts. We take that true power must traduce the voter's capability of really influencing the result of the election, so as to enforce his personal interest. A formalization of this criterion is presented. Also, a characterization is obtained for voting games in which the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf-Coleman's power indices on the one hand, and the Taylor's influence relation on the other hand actually traduce the voter's capability of enforcing his personal interest in the election. Plusieurs théories de pouvoir a priori ont été introduites dans les jeux de vote. Sans être exhaustif, on peut citer : l'indice de Shapley-Shubik, l'indice absolu de Banzhaf-Coleman et la relation d'influence de Taylor. Ces théories tentent de comparer les joueurs sur la base du "pouvoir" que chacun détient dans le jeu de votre. Dans cet article, nous voulons cerner la nature du pouvoir dont il s'agit. Pour cela, nous posons a priori que le pouvoir dans un vote doit traduire l'aptitude d'un joueur à influencer le résultat de ce vote. Formalisant ce critère, nous caractérisons les classes de jeux de vote pour lesquelles la relation d'influence de Taylor d'une part, les indices de Shapley-Shubik et de Banzhaf Coleman d'autre part, traduisent bien l'aptitude à influencer le résultat du vote. |
| collection |
OpenEdition Journal |
| language |
Français |
| format |
Article ou chapitre numérique |
| building |
0/Bibliothèque numérique/ 1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/ |
| topic |
jeu de vote jeu simple indice de pouvoir relation d'influence voting game simple game power indices influence relation |
| spellingShingle |
jeu de vote jeu simple indice de pouvoir relation d'influence voting game simple game power indices influence relation Diffo Lambo, Lawrence Moulen, Joël Quel pouvoir mesure-t-on dans un jeu de vote ? |
| description |
Several a priori power concepts for voting games are available in the literature. To name only a few, we have the Shapely-Shubik and the Banzhaf-Coleman's power indices, and the Taylor's influence relation. Each of these concepts is an attempt to rank the voters with respect to how much empowered they are. In this paper, we are focused on the true nature of the power modelled by these concepts. We take that true power must traduce the voter's capability of really influencing the result of the election, so as to enforce his personal interest. A formalization of this criterion is presented. Also, a characterization is obtained for voting games in which the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf-Coleman's power indices on the one hand, and the Taylor's influence relation on the other hand actually traduce the voter's capability of enforcing his personal interest in the election. |
| author |
Diffo Lambo, Lawrence Moulen, Joël |
| author_facet |
Diffo Lambo, Lawrence Moulen, Joël |
| author_sort |
Diffo Lambo, Lawrence |
| title |
Quel pouvoir mesure-t-on dans un jeu de vote ? |
| title_short |
Quel pouvoir mesure-t-on dans un jeu de vote ? |
| title_full |
Quel pouvoir mesure-t-on dans un jeu de vote ? |
| title_fullStr |
Quel pouvoir mesure-t-on dans un jeu de vote ? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Quel pouvoir mesure-t-on dans un jeu de vote ? |
| title_sort |
quel pouvoir mesure-t-on dans un jeu de vote ? |
| publisher |
Mathématiques et sciences humaines |
| publishDate |
2006 |
| container_title |
URI:https://journals.openedition.org/msh |
| url |
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/msh.2821 https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/msh/2821 |
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1877244718382841856 |