Quel pouvoir mesure-t-on dans un jeu de vote ?
Several a priori power concepts for voting games are available in the literature. To name only a few, we have the Shapely-Shubik and the Banzhaf-Coleman's power indices, and the Taylor's influence relation. Each of these concepts is an attempt to rank the voters with respect to how much em...
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| I publikationen: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/msh, |
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| Huvudupphovsmän: | , |
| Materialtyp: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Språk: | Français |
| Publicerad: |
Mathématiques et sciences humaines
2006
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| Ämnen: | |
| Länkar: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Sammanfattning: | Several a priori power concepts for voting games are available in the literature. To name only a few, we have the Shapely-Shubik and the Banzhaf-Coleman's power indices, and the Taylor's influence relation. Each of these concepts is an attempt to rank the voters with respect to how much empowered they are. In this paper, we are focused on the true nature of the power modelled by these concepts. We take that true power must traduce the voter's capability of really influencing the result of the election, so as to enforce his personal interest. A formalization of this criterion is presented. Also, a characterization is obtained for voting games in which the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf-Coleman's power indices on the one hand, and the Taylor's influence relation on the other hand actually traduce the voter's capability of enforcing his personal interest in the election. |
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