How do overconfident CEOs behave in competitive product markets: Evidence from stock price crash risk
This paper investigates how CEO overconfidence affects the stock price crash risk in a competitive environment. Using a sample of French companies, we find that overconfident CEOs positively influence the stock price crash risk. This finding suggests that overconfident CEOs are more likely to keep m...
Enregistré dans:
| Udgivet i: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/fcs, |
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Sprog: | Anglais |
| Udgivet: |
Finance Contrôle Stratégie
2022
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| Fag: | |
| Online adgang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Summary: | This paper investigates how CEO overconfidence affects the stock price crash risk in a competitive environment. Using a sample of French companies, we find that overconfident CEOs positively influence the stock price crash risk. This finding suggests that overconfident CEOs are more likely to keep money-losing projects and hoard bad news because they overestimate the long-term value of their projects, leading to stock price crashes. The results also show that the positive effect of CEO overconfidence on the stock price crash risk is less pronounced in competitive product markets. This result suggests that product market competition can help constraining the managerial irrationality effect on stock price crash risk. |
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