CEO Incentive Pay and Real Earnings Management: Does Corporate Ownership Structure Matter? Evidence from French Listed Companies
CEO incentive compensation continues to increase, and its efficiency remains a highly debated topic. This study examines the effect of CEO incentive compensation and ownership type on the extent of real earnings management (REM). Through an empirical analysis of panel data of 108 French firms listed...
Сохранить в:
| Опубликовано в: : | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/fcs, |
|---|---|
| Главные авторы: | , |
| Формат: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Язык: | Anglais |
| Опубликовано: |
Finance Contrôle Stratégie
2021
|
| Предметы: | |
| Online-ссылка: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| id |
openedition-oai:revues.org:fcs_7595 |
|---|---|
| record_format |
openedition |
| spelling |
openedition-oai:revues.org:fcs_7595 https://doi.org/10.4000/fcs.7595 urn:doi:10.4000/fcs.7595 en https://journals.openedition.org/fcs/7595 2021-06-28T02:00:00Z info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess article info:eu-repo/semantics/article urn:handle:20.500.13089/gask All rights reserved CEO Incentive Pay and Real Earnings Management: Does Corporate Ownership Structure Matter? Evidence from French Listed Companies Finance Contrôle Stratégie Association FCS info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2261-5512 info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1287-1141 URI:https://journals.openedition.org/fcs Elage , Adam Dardour, Ali Gestion réelle des résultats rémunération incitative des dirigeants structure de l’actionnariat. Real earnings management CEO incentive pay ownership structure. CEO incentive compensation continues to increase, and its efficiency remains a highly debated topic. This study examines the effect of CEO incentive compensation and ownership type on the extent of real earnings management (REM). Through an empirical analysis of panel data of 108 French firms listed on the SBF 120 index, we show that the CEO incentives ratio is positively associated with the extent of REM. Furthermore, we find that CEOs of firms controlled by families or institutional investors engage less in REM when they have greater incentives. By contrast, State ownership does not have any effect on this relationship. Le niveau de la rémunération incitative des dirigeants continue d’augmenter et son efficience demeure un sujet de débat. Cette étude examine l’effet de la rémunération incitative des dirigeants et la structure de propriété sur les pratiques de gestion réelle des résultats dans les entreprises françaises cotées à l’indice SBF 120. Basée sur des données de panel pour 108 entreprises firmes, l’analyse empirique montre que le ratio des rémunérations incitatives accroît l’ampleur de la gestion réelle des résultats. Nous montrons que les dirigeants des entreprises contrôlées par des familles et par des investisseurs institutionnels sont moins impliqués dans la gestion des résultats lorsqu’ils reçoivent une part de rémunération incitative plus importante. En revanche, la propriété de l’État n’a aucun effet sur cette relation. |
| collection |
OpenEdition Journal |
| language |
Anglais |
| format |
Article ou chapitre numérique |
| building |
0/Bibliothèque numérique/ 1/Bibliothèque numérique/OpenEdition Journals/ |
| topic |
Gestion réelle des résultats rémunération incitative des dirigeants structure de l’actionnariat. Real earnings management CEO incentive pay ownership structure. |
| spellingShingle |
Gestion réelle des résultats rémunération incitative des dirigeants structure de l’actionnariat. Real earnings management CEO incentive pay ownership structure. Elage , Adam Dardour, Ali CEO Incentive Pay and Real Earnings Management: Does Corporate Ownership Structure Matter? Evidence from French Listed Companies |
| description |
CEO incentive compensation continues to increase, and its efficiency remains a highly debated topic. This study examines the effect of CEO incentive compensation and ownership type on the extent of real earnings management (REM). Through an empirical analysis of panel data of 108 French firms listed on the SBF 120 index, we show that the CEO incentives ratio is positively associated with the extent of REM. Furthermore, we find that CEOs of firms controlled by families or institutional investors engage less in REM when they have greater incentives. By contrast, State ownership does not have any effect on this relationship. |
| author |
Elage , Adam Dardour, Ali |
| author_facet |
Elage , Adam Dardour, Ali |
| author_sort |
Elage , Adam |
| title |
CEO Incentive Pay and Real Earnings Management: Does Corporate Ownership Structure Matter? Evidence from French Listed Companies |
| title_short |
CEO Incentive Pay and Real Earnings Management: Does Corporate Ownership Structure Matter? Evidence from French Listed Companies |
| title_full |
CEO Incentive Pay and Real Earnings Management: Does Corporate Ownership Structure Matter? Evidence from French Listed Companies |
| title_fullStr |
CEO Incentive Pay and Real Earnings Management: Does Corporate Ownership Structure Matter? Evidence from French Listed Companies |
| title_full_unstemmed |
CEO Incentive Pay and Real Earnings Management: Does Corporate Ownership Structure Matter? Evidence from French Listed Companies |
| title_sort |
ceo incentive pay and real earnings management: does corporate ownership structure matter? evidence from french listed companies |
| publisher |
Finance Contrôle Stratégie |
| publishDate |
2021 |
| container_title |
URI:https://journals.openedition.org/fcs |
| url |
https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://doi.org/10.4000/fcs.7595 https://ezproxy.univ-orleans.fr/login?url=https://journals.openedition.org/fcs/7595 |
| _version_ |
1877293542991200256 |