CEO Incentive Pay and Real Earnings Management: Does Corporate Ownership Structure Matter? Evidence from French Listed Companies
CEO incentive compensation continues to increase, and its efficiency remains a highly debated topic. This study examines the effect of CEO incentive compensation and ownership type on the extent of real earnings management (REM). Through an empirical analysis of panel data of 108 French firms listed...
Wedi'i Gadw mewn:
| Cyhoeddwyd yn: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/fcs, |
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| Prif Awduron: | , |
| Fformat: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Iaith: | Anglais |
| Cyhoeddwyd: |
Finance Contrôle Stratégie
2021
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| Pynciau: | |
| Mynediad Ar-lein: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Crynodeb: | CEO incentive compensation continues to increase, and its efficiency remains a highly debated topic. This study examines the effect of CEO incentive compensation and ownership type on the extent of real earnings management (REM). Through an empirical analysis of panel data of 108 French firms listed on the SBF 120 index, we show that the CEO incentives ratio is positively associated with the extent of REM. Furthermore, we find that CEOs of firms controlled by families or institutional investors engage less in REM when they have greater incentives. By contrast, State ownership does not have any effect on this relationship. |
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