Multiple class shares and double voting rights: Literature review and research prospects
Dual class shares and multiple voting rights have increasingly developed despite formal reference to the “one share–one vote” principle. This contradictory situation is analyzed within a survey of the academic literature to understand the reasons why shareholding structures with equal rights and une...
Kaydedildi:
| Yayımlandı: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/fcs, |
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| Yazar: | |
| Materyal Türü: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Dil: | Anglais |
| Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
Finance Contrôle Stratégie
2023
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| Konular: | |
| Online Erişim: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Özet: | Dual class shares and multiple voting rights have increasingly developed despite formal reference to the “one share–one vote” principle. This contradictory situation is analyzed within a survey of the academic literature to understand the reasons why shareholding structures with equal rights and unequal rights between shareholders may coexist in firm ownership. The financial literature is screened through the key concept of dual class shares. This concept has both theoretical and empirical consequences and needs to be analyzed in a dynamic framework referring to the firm economic life cycle. The steps of firm development sometimes need a concentration of economic power and control by some shareholders, particularly after an initial public offering, and sometimes should be based on equal treatment between shareholders. We conclude in favor of an evolutionary approach toward legal contractual rules. We identify seven avenues for future research. |
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