Disagreement as Duty
I. IntroductionThis essay focuses on the significance of disagreement in what Cavell has coined “Emersonian” perfectionism. This moral outlook holds that everyday moral duties and choices, unlike epistemological cases, ultimately rest on our personal assessment and justification of an action. It is...
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| Pubblicato in: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap, |
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| Autore principale: | |
| Natura: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Lingua: | Anglais |
| Pubblicazione: |
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
2017
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| Accesso online: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Riassunto: | I. IntroductionThis essay focuses on the significance of disagreement in what Cavell has coined “Emersonian” perfectionism. This moral outlook holds that everyday moral duties and choices, unlike epistemological cases, ultimately rest on our personal assessment and justification of an action. It is therefore possible (and likely) that disagreements point not to moral incompetence, but to a conflict of desires – crucially including a conflict of ones own desires. As a consequence, the demand ... |
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