Man as the Measure of All Things
What is the purpose of metaethics in relation to ethical theory and ethical practice in contemporary philosophical practice? Metaethics is preoccupied with (at least) three particularly fundamental concepts: (1) moral properties, (2) systematization (in Moore’s sense, but also in the sense of law),...
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| Udgivet i: | URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap, |
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| Hovedforfatter: | |
| Format: | Article ou chapitre numérique |
| Sprog: | Anglais |
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European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
2017
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| Online adgang: | Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM Accès Université d'Orléans et IFPM |
| Summary: | What is the purpose of metaethics in relation to ethical theory and ethical practice in contemporary philosophical practice? Metaethics is preoccupied with (at least) three particularly fundamental concepts: (1) moral properties, (2) systematization (in Moore’s sense, but also in the sense of law), and (3) the finite – this latter concept may only be evident incidentally but is fatally neglected. What is needed for a rounder philosophical picture is an account of three complementary concepts: (1) moral character, (2) the spirit of law, and (3) the infinite. Streams of thought are emerging from neglected traditions, particularly those of pragmatism and early American transcendentalism, that offer a means for reconciling these two sides. This paper brings together elements of these traditions in a sort of initiatory conversation, one that takes seriously the need for an integrated conceptual framework. This process of reconciliation allows for a liberal narrative that begins with Protagoras’ notion of man as the measure of all things and ends with a quasi-Cavellian notion of moral perfection. |
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